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Other Lending Activities
EFINANCING distress mortgages constituted, of course, the major
work of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. The Corpora-
tion's activities, however, included several other types of lending,
both during the original lending period—from June 1933 to June
1936—and later. These consisted of loans for reconditioning, insur-
ance and taxes, ref undings of loans in default, extensions, and credits
extended in connection with the sale of foreclosed properties. Table
36 shows advances from June 13, 1933, to March 31, 1951, classified
according to purpose.
LOANS FOR MAINTENANCE AND RECONDITIONING
Cash was sometimes advanced for property repairs in the HOLC's
original lending, but as a rule only for those repairs necessary to pre-
vent, or possibly to offset, serious structural deterioration as distin-
guished from normal. depreciation and obsolescence.' Authorized by
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 to make advances for necessary
repairs and maintenance 2(referredto hereafter as maintenance
loans), and wishing to conserve its resources for cases of real need, the
HOLC generally restricted these loans to financing such things as
roofing, repairs to plumbing and heating systems, and the strengthen-
ing of foundations; remodeling, modernization, painting and dec-
orating, and landscaping loans were seldom made.
Less than a year after the first HOLC loan had been made, how-
ever, Congress authorized the advance of cash or bonds for "the reha-
bilitation, modernization, rebuilding and enlargement" of homes on
which it had made, or was aboUt to make, refinancing loans (referred
to hereafter as loans for reconditioning).3 The total maximum loan
1TheHOLC was free to obtain funds for making repair and maintenance loans by
selling its bonds in the general market. It was not required to transfer the bonds them.
selves to contractors to pay for repairs.
2June13, 1933, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128, Sec. 4 (d).
3April27, 1934, c. 168, 48 Stat. 643, Sec. 2. This was theguaranteeing the prin-
cipal of HOLC bonds.
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on any property was limited to 80 percent of the HOLC appraisal
value, or to $14,000 (whichever was less), and no loan could be made
if the value was above $20,000; the funds for such rehabilitation loans
were limited first to $200 million but were ultimately raised to $400
million.4 The dominant objective of this. liberalization appears to
have been to stimulate the construction industry and business gen-
erally, but other ends were sought as well: to provide more aid to
home owners, to improve the security for J-IOLC loans, and possibly
to aid in making properties more nearly self-supporting by the addi-
tion of income-producing features.
TABLE 36 —ADVANCESBY THE HOLC TO ORIGINAL BORROWERS, BY PUR-










1934 $2 $17 .. .. $19
1935 85 391 $4 $1 481
1936 1,564 2,145 311 22 4,042
1937 11,349 1,216 528 66 13,159
1938 18,607 1,270 386 133 20,396
1939 36,992 1,069 415 146 38,622
1940 66,283 778 887 882 68,830
1941 13,166 1,103 895 590 15,754
1942—51 15,047 1,257 1,593 406 18,303
Total $163,095 $9,246 $5,019 $2,246 $179,606
a NinthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1941) p. 144; and
data made available by the HOLC.
b Excludes foreclosure costs of $3.8 million.
By the end of 1934, 464,836 applications for $93 million of recon-
ditioning loans had been filed, an average of about $200 per prop-
erty; 185,229 applications were granted, in part at least, for a total of
4 June 27, 1934, C.847, 48 Stat. 1246, Sec. 506 (b); May 28, 1935, c. 150, 49 Stat. 293,
Sec.16. The fact that it raised the limit twice suggests that Congress was actively inter-
ested in permitting the HOLC to make reconditioning loans. Although the arguments
were not developed in detail, one can point to certain advantages of "reconditioning"
spending as a possible stimulant to the general economy. This spending would be wide.
spread, so that the stimulating effects would not be concentrated in a few areas. It could
be administered without the apparent wastes of "boondogling." Since it would consist
of a multitude of relatively small projects, extensive and time-consuming planning
would not be required. The home owner, who would have to pay ultimately, would
generally be at hand to press for economy.OTHER LENDING ACTIVITIES 129
$33 million, an average Of about $175 per case; 96 percent of those
filed were classified as for repair and only 4 percent for modernization
and remodeling.5 By July 2, 1936—roughly the date when the last
original loan was made—675,042 applications for reconditioning
loans had been received; 478,467 had been approved for $99 million,
and formal contracts for 361,353 cases totaling $71 million had been
let; of these cases, 336,058 jobs had already been completed for $64
million; 6inaddition, 23,777 reconditioning job.s were financed pri-
marily by proceeds from insurance; 303,178 cases had been with-
drawn or suspended.7 By June 30, 1937, 444,226 reconditioning
contracts had been completed for a total of about $83 million, roughly
$190 a case; 8 24,186 of these cases were financed primarily by insur-
ance proceeds and 49,227 were on properties the HOLC had ac-
quired. All but about 6,500 of these loans for reconditioning were
made to borrowers during the original lending period, and with
minor exceptions the amounts were included in the original loans;
presumably, most of these advances could not have been made under
the original terms limiting advances for ,repairs to those that were
No data are ,available on the way the outlays were distributed in
the early years. A 1938 analysis of reconditioning' outlays on proper-
ties the HOLC had acquired showed the following distribution: °
Interior decorating 39%
Exterior painting 22
Carpentry and miliwork 12
Heating, plumbing, and
electrical facilities 9
Roofing and sheet metal 7
Brick, stone, and tile '3
Stoves and ranges 2
5SecondAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (December 31, 1934) p. 88.
t3Thiswas equal to about 3 percent of the economy's total expenditures on new,
nonfarm, residential construction during the period from September 1933 to December
1936. If the total $400 million authorized by Congress had been spent during the lending
period, or within six months of its end (that is, by December 1936), total national
outlays on construction would have been increased by an amount equal to about 18 per-
cent of outlays on new nonfarm residences, ignoring secondary effects.
7FourthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1936) Exhibit
12, p. 125.
8FifthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1937) p. 32.
9SixthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938) Chart 18,
p. 88. Estimates based on a sample study of representative reconditioning cases on
acquired properties in process during March 1938.130 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
Plastering and stucco I
Landscaping 1
Miscellaneous (hardware,
cleaning, shades, etc.) 4
.100%
Advances made by the HOLC to original borrowers for mainte-
nance purposes—and these were probably not greatly different from
the reconditioning loans later authorized by Congress—continued
after the end of the original lending period but in very small
amounts.10 Through March 31, 1951,.the total loaned on this basis
was only about $5 million (Table 36). Reconditioning loans totaling
roughly $80 million fell far short of the amount authorized: nearly
half of all applications were rejected, and $320 million of lending
power was unused (roughly $350 million, if it is assumed that one-
third of the reconditioning loans might have been made under the
earlier authority to make necessary repair and maintenance loans).
It is not possible, of course, to give a definitive answer to the question
of why more loans were not made, but it was probably due to a com-
bination of circumstances, including the HOLC's desire to encourage
lending by private agencies, its wish to limit its own risks and to pro-
tect borrowers from overextending themselves, and, finally, to the
fact that in the early days of HOLC operations the applications of
borrowers for reconditioning loans had to be subordinated to the
more urgent needs of refinancing;
TAX AND INSURANCE ACcOUNTS
Of the total funds disbursed by the HOLC during the original lend-
ing period—$3.l billion—$208 million were extended for unpaid
taxes, $25 million for special assessments, and $6 million for the pay-
ment of insurance premiums. Also, it was necessary from time to time
after the HOLC refinancing had been completed to make additional
advances to borrowers to pay delinquent taxes or to finance the main-
tenance of adequate insurance protection for the property. By 1951,
a total of approximately $171 million additional funds had been
loaned on original and vendee loans for taxes and another $10 mil-
lion for the payment of insurance premiums.
Despite the fact that borrowers agreed to keep up taxes and insur-
ance when the original loans were made, by 1937 the HOLC found
10Mostdelays resulted apparently from legal complications.OTHER LENDING ACTIVITIES 131
that 40 percent of them had become delinquent in paying their taxes
in one or more years after their first HOLC loan." Insurance pre-
miums were less burdensome, of course, but by 1934 the HOLC
found that advances were necessary to prevent lapses in about half
of the cases in which insurance policies were expiring; by 1937 these
cases had fallen to about one in ten, mainly as a result of the HOLC's
vigilance.12 -
Taxdelinquency and the lapsing of insurance protection pre-
sented serious prpblems both to the HOLC and to the mortgagors;
yet despite the HOLC's efforts to prevent such incidents, and the
severity of the tax laws against tax, delinquency (interest on tax
arrears at the rate of 1 percent a month and the right of the govern-
ment to sell the property to recover taxes—after three years delin-
quency as a rule—were not unusual), additional steps had to be taken
to reduce the practice. A special section was established by the HOLC
to handle insurance problems before the end of its original lending
period, and in 1937 an intensive program was started to eliminate
and prevent further accumulation of tax arrears. A more satisfactory
method of handling the tax problem was soughtin a system under
which borrowers might make monthly deposits with the HOLC to
repay tax advances (where these had been made) and to accumulate
funds to pay accruing taxes. In June 1938, 34,116 borrowers, whose
accounts represented 3.5 percent of all outstanding loans, had such
accounts.'3 Nevertheless, a year later, the HOLC reported that 227,-
317 borrowers were in default on taxes, 10 percent for considerably
more than two years; over half of these were also in default on their
loan accounts.14 Renewed efforts were made to get borrowers to pay
off arrearages, but where the borrower was unable to do so the HOLC
continued to make tax advances.
A more formalized system was installed under which borrowers
allowed the HOLC to add one-twelfth of the estimated annual tax to
the amount due monthly on interest and principal. Actual payment
to the local government was made annually by the HOLC from the
11 Sixth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938)75.
12Fifth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1937) p.35.
13.SixthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938) p.75.
14Seventh Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1939) pp.
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accumulated tax fund. Funds to pay accruing insurance premiums
were also added to the monthly payments; these, too, were paid out
directly by the HOLC. Borrowers were strongly urged to participate.
Moreover, signing of a tax and insurance agreement was made a nec-
essary condition for obtaining loan extension and for the purchase
of a property from the HOLC (except for cash). Because of the Mead-
Barry Act of 1939, described in the next section, there was an active
demand for extensions just when borrowers were being pressed to
participate. By June 30, 1940, 328,074 accounts—38.3 percent of all
those outstanding—had tax and insurance agreements. Whereas in
July 1939, 205,045 accounts (24.2 percent of the total active accounts)
were in arrears on taxes, the number 'had fallen to 44,065 in June
1940 (5.1 percent).15 During 1942 more than 50 percent of all ac-
counts had such agreements, and, by the end of 1948, 78 percent had
enrolled.
A huge amount of detailed was required by the
tax and insurance accounts. There were monthly postings of pay-
ments to individual ledger cards, extra work in accounting and bill-
ing, determination of the amounts of tax due and timely payment to
the proper official, and safekeeping and renewal of insurance policies.
In 1938, for example, 727,641 insurance policies expired and roughly
one million tax vouchers had to be prepared.'6 Commissions earned
for servicing the insurance contracts helped pay operating costs.'7
Obtaining the cooperation of tax authorities was difficult in many
communities, especially where records and organization were not
15 Eighth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1940) p. 128.
10 U. S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1940, 76th Congress,
1st Session (1939) pp. 1318-19. -
17These commissions, allowed by the insurance companies, averaged about 15 per-
cent of the standard insurance premiums. For the 1940 fiscal year, total costs of operating
the tax and insurance section were probably somewhat over $1 million; they declined
thereafter. During the forties, when the system was well established, commissions were
well above direct operating costs. As noted in Chapter 7, the HOLC's efforts to reduce
fire hazards were extended, in varying degrees, to all borrowers. The success of these
efforts helped in overcoming some reluctance of insurance companies to granting the
I-IOLC commissions for helping service policies. The HOLC paid borrowers no interest
-on funds received in advance of the date of payment to the local government or to the
insurance company. Since the HOLC had the use of these funds, it presumably saved
some interest as a result. For the ten.year period ending in 1948 it is estimated that the
HOLC saved interest charges of $1,312,500. Other savings were the estimated $300,000
a year spent at one time in searching tax records, the heavy expenses of following up
borrower tax delinquencies, and probable avoidance of many foreclosures.OTHER LENDING ACTIVITIES 133
such as readily to provide the HOLC with all necessary information.18
It was not long, however, before the advantages of the. system to the
taxing governments were widely recognized.
REFUNDING OF LOANS IN DEFAULT
Delinquency gave rise to another form of "lending." When a bor-
rower temporarily got in arrears on his instalment payments (because
of unemployment, family illness, or other reason) and was then able
to resume his payments, the HOLC tolerated the delinquency to
varying degree. It did not always recast the loan, however, but pressed
the borrower to increase his monthly payments until he had elim-
inated the arrearage. More formal arrangements were also made to
extend arrearages.
The Home Owners' Loan Act stated that "The Corporation may
at any time grant an extension of time to any home owner for the pay-
ment of any instalment of principal or interest owed by him to the
Corporation if, in the judgment of the Corporation, the circum-
stances of the home owner and the condition of the security justify
such extension..'° Under a policy initiated in February 1937
this authority was widely used. By refraining from immediate fore-
closure action, the HOLC was in effect granting an extension, but the
term came to be applied only. to those cases in which there was a
formal loan extension agreement extending the time for the payment
of any instalment of principal and interest owed the HOLC. Where
the HOLC believed, however, that the borrower had some chance
to meet the obligation, and a sincere desire to do so, the contract
would be revised, all or part of the amount in default would be
added to the principal of the loan, the account would be readmitted
to good standing, and the monthly payments would be increased to
amortize the remaining balance in not more than fifteen years from
the date the loan was originally made. Although quicker amortization
was often provided for, it was less often accomplished.
Finally, a loan might be the subject of more than one extension.
From February 1937 to July 1939, just under 82,000 original loans
were extended, which, at the time, were roughly 10 percentof the
accounts outstanding. In its report for 1938 the HOLC stated that the
18 In the thirties, a very large number of local governments did not mail property
tax bills. .
19June 13, 1933, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128, Sec. 4 (d).134 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
payment record of these accounts was good; but since over half of the
extensions were less than a year old, it is obvious that the judgment
was based on very limited experience. At the same time, an additional
large number of accounts (115,579) were in• default on principal,
interest, and taxes.2°
EXTENSION OF CONTRACT TERM UNDER
MEAD-BARRY ACT
Although the HOLC felt that it was being as considerate as possible,
there was strong public pressure for it to grant even more generous
terms. By 1938, frequent references were made to the desirability of
according longer periods for amortization of principal and to liberal-
ize terms in other ways, notably by reducing the interest rate.
The HOLC's chief reason for opposing this liberalization .was the
danger of loss.21 The loans had originally been of poor quality; the
properties securing them were old; and borrowers had already re-
ceived such favorable terms that the losses were not recoverable, and
any additional liberalization would inevitably increase them. Such
losses, the HOLC argued, would impose unjustified burdens on the
taxpayers generally for the benefit of about 3 percent of the popula-
tion. It was argued, further, that the proposed aid would not mate-
rially alleviate the circumstances of embarrassed borrowers, that ex-
tensions were, in fact, being made in all cases where there was real
need and a reasonable prospect of eventual repayment of the obliga-
tion, that some families were "overhoused" and could effectively solve
their problem only by sale of the property and use of more modest
quarters, and, finally, that the seriousness of the foreclosure situation
had been greatly exaggerated, considering the fact that many fore-
closures were due to property abandonment, willful default, non-
cooperation, death of borrower, or legal complications, none of which
was likely to be improved appreciably by the reduction of the
monthly payment. Additional reasons cited were: the recasting of
loans would be expensive; borrowers who had not retired all of the
loan by the end of the fifteen-year period should be able to get private
financing if the security were good enough for an HOLC loan; evi-
dence of the failure of the HOLC to grant extensions in deserving
c.ases had not been presented.
20 Seventh Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 80, 1939) p. 131.
21 Sixth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938) pp. 94-96.• OTHER LENDING ACTIVITIES 135
The controversy continued, with the HOLC holding to its opposi-
tion, but, in the summer of 1939, the Corporation announced that it
would favor legislation giving it discretionary power to lengthen the
contract term.22 With administration support the Mead-Barry Act
was passed, authorizing the HOLC, at its discretjon, to allow a period
up to twenty-five years from the date of the loan for repayment on
original loans and twenty years on vendee loans. The Act became law
inAugust 1939.23
The HOLC began at once to use its new authority. All accounts
that were in default at the time were reviewed; most foreclosure ac-
tions were temporarily suspended to see if foreclosures might be
forestalled by recasting loans to take advantage of the longer amorti-
zation and to take account of the lower interest rate. For a few
months, the foreclosure rate dropped and stayed much below what it
had been and what it became for a time later on. Foreclosures were
made only where extensions would offer no solution, for example, in
cases of abandonment of the property, death of the borrower, willful
default, hopeless inability to pay, and similar instances. All borrowers
were informed of the new law and told that applications for exten-
sions might be filed.
In the first nine months, 229,945 applications for extensions and
revisions of contracts were received, of which 192,667 were approved
by the HOLC; 16,583 cases were rejected, 9;581 were withdrawn by
the applicant, and the balance were still in progress, 5,331 having
been approved but not closed. However, only 172,491 of the approved
applications involved lengthening of the amortization period. Appli-
cations for extensions were made on roughly 30 percent of the loans
outstanding during the year.24 During the next fiscal year (1940-41),
61,134 more extensions of contract term were granted,25 and in the
22See,for example, 11. S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for
1940, 76th Congress, 1st Session (1939) pp. 1355-59. After passage of the Mead.Barry
Act, the HOLC used the term "extension" to refer only to loans on which the contract
term was lengthened. The terms "recast" or "revised" were used to refer to loans on
which past due principal or interest were refunded.
23 August 11, 1939, Part 2, c. 684, 53 Stat. 403. Also, in October 1939, the HOLC
voluntarily reduced the rate of interest on all of its loans from 5 percent to 41/2percent.
24 Eighth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1940) pp.
124-25.
25 Ninth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1941) p. 144.
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next year, 17,545. Thereafter, the number of extensions increased
slowly.
Of the 255,632 Mead-Barry extensions that had been made by
March 31, 1951, 249,904 were on original loans and 5,728 were on
vendee accounts, that is, on loans made in connection with the
HOLC's sale of foreclosed property. When the great bulk had been
made, by the end of 1942, they totaled only about 30 percent of the
loans outstanding. The number of vendee accounts extended was
never over 4 percent. In New York, 34,575 loans (43 percent) were
extended under the Mead-Barry Act; in Massachusetts, 42 percent; in
New Jersey, 35 percent; in Illinois, 28 percent; in Ohio, 27 percent;
in Alabama, 29 percent; in Texas, 13 percent; and in California, 11
percent.
Of the 285,319 extensions (including regular as well as Mead-
Barry extensions) made between October 1, 1939 and November 30,
1941, 10 percent were on loans in arrears less than three months, 43
percent in arrears from three to twelve months, 17 percent in arrears
from twelve to eighteen months, and 30 percent in arrears for eight-
een months and over.26 Many of the cases in arrears for a year or more
would likely have resulted in foreclosure had it not been for the
extension of loan contract term.
Extended loans were twice as large on the average as those not
extended. As of June 30, 1942, the average outstanding balance on
unextended original loans was $1,450; for extended loans the com-
parable figure was about $2,900. On June30, 1940, the balances ex-
tended were $534 million out of a total amount due of $1,986 million.
Two years later, the outstanding balances on extended loans totaled
$690 million out of a total then due of $1,689 million. The relative
importance of the amounts extended grew so that by the end of the
1946 fiscal year extended amounts were more than half of the total
due—$380 million out of a total of $735 million.
To the end of 1942, 35 percent of the Mead-Barry extensions were
for the maximum period allowed (twenty-five years) and another 24
percent were extended for over twenty-four but less than twenty-five
years (Table 37). In other words, the HOLC did not automatically
grant the full extension permitted but attempted to meet the circum-
28U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1943, 77th Congress.
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stances of each case. In granting extensions, the interest in default
was added to the principal as well as advances for taxes and other
purposes. One condition for receiving an extension was that the bor-
rower would enter into the tax and insurance agreement discussed
above.
TABLE 37 —NUMBEROF ORIGINAL LOANS AND VENDEE ACCOUNTS Ex-
TENDED AND RECAST BY THE HOLC UNDER THE MEAD-BARRY






15 butless than16 4,496 • 1.8%
16 butless than17 6,154 •2.5
17butless than18 7,962 3.2
18 butless than19 8,942 3.6 .
19 butless than20 10,825 4.3
20 butlessthan21 11,378 4.5
21 butless than22 12,006 4.8
22 butless than23 15,221 6.1
23 butless than24 24,589. 9.8
• 24 butless than25 61,386 •24.4
25 • 88,261 35.1
Total 251,170 100.0%
a U. S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1914, 78th Congress,
1st Session (1943) p. 1052. Data on vendee accounts exclude cash sales.
bCalculatedfrom original date of loan.
c The total number of accounts extended under' the Mead-Barry Act was 255,632
through March 31, 1951.
VENDEE ACCOUNTS
HOLC lending took still another form—the financing of purchases of
properties acquired from original borrowers who had failed to meet
their obligations. Such lending wasnotspecifically authorized by the
statute that established the HOLC, or by later amendments, but
implicit authorization may be found in the statutory provision direct-
ing the HOLC to make such rules and regulations not inconsistent
with the statute as "may be for the proper conduct of the
affairs of the Corporation." 27ToMarch 31, 1951, the HOLC had
acquired and sold 199,854 houses for $738 million (Table 38). On
27June13, 1933, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128, Sec. 4 (k).138 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 38 —SUMMARYOF 199,854 VENDEE ACCOUNTS OF THE HOLC,
AS OF MARCH 31, 1951 a
(inthousands)












Interest Converted to Principal 206
TOTAL CAPJTALIZATION ON
INSTALMENT SALES $603,799
Repayments of Principal 593,077
Transfers to Property Account 10,722
aDatamade available by the HOLC.
b Includes foreclosure and repossession costs of
15,379 Of these, cash sales amounting to $50 million were made; on
the other 184,475 houses (including 1,639 divisions of security) initial
payments of $94 million were made, with the balance of $594 million
in some form of "vendee" loan obligation to the HOLC.28 The aver-
age loan on these properties at the time of sale was $3,222. This was
somewhat more than the average of its original loans, and consider-
ably less than the average loan amount 'on properties acquired
through foreclosure.
Almost three-fifths of these sales were concentrated in the three
fiscal years ending in June 1941, nearly $125 million in the next two
fiscal years, and $125 million in the following three fiscal years. A
large part of the sales in 1944 and 1945 was made in the New York
region, so that the later loans tended to cluster in this region. As of
June 30, 1947, $130 million vendee loans (22 percent of the total)
were made in New York State and $50 million (almost 9 percent)
were made in New Jersey. Illinois and Ohio accounted for over $40
million each, with Massachusetts and Pennsylvania next in impor-
28 The terms of sale are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.OTHER LENDING ACTIVITIES 139
tance. For reasons discussed in Chapter 7, the record of vendees as
borrowers was far more satisfactory than the record of original bor-
rowers.2°
29ThroughJune 30, 1950, the interest yield from vendee accounts was approximately
$135 million. At an average interest rate of 41/2percent,this figure represents a total
investment of roughly $3 billion over a fifteen-year period. Assuming that the total cost
of funds borrowed by the HOLC (at an estimated average interest rate of 2 percent)
was $60 million and that the total cost of servicing vendee accounts was $7million
(based on an estimated annual cost of $6 per loan), the net earnings from vendee
accounts through June 30, 1950 were around $68 million.